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MODEL THEORY AND ULTRAPRODUCTS
M. MALLIARIS
Abstract. The article motivates recent work on saturation of ultrapowers
from a general mathematical point of view.
Introduction. space
In the history of mathematics the idea of the limit has had a remarkable effect
on organizing and making visible a certain kind of structure. Its effects can be seen
from calculus to extremal graph theory.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Cantor introduced infinite cardinals, which
allow for a stratification of size in a potentially much deeper way. It is often thought
that these ideas, however beautiful, are studied in modern mathematics primarily by
set theorists, and that aside from occasional independence results, the hierarchy of
infinities has not profoundly influenced, say, algebra, geometry, analysis or topology,
and perhaps is not suited to do so.
What this conventional wisdom misses is a powerful kind of reflection or trans-
mutation arising from the development of model theory. As the field of model
theory has developed over the last century, its methods have allowed for serious
interaction with algebraic geometry, number theory, and general topology. One of
the unique successes of model theoretic classification theory is precisely in allowing
for a kind of distillation and focusing of the information gleaned from the open-
ing up of the hierarchy of infinities into definitions and tools for studying specific
mathematical structures.
By the time they are used, the form of the tools may not reflect this influence.
However, if we are interested in advancing further, it may be useful to remember
it. Along this seam, so to speak, may be precisely where we will want to re-orient
our approach.
The model theoretic point of view. space
The model theoretic setup is designed to allow in a specific way for placing a
given infinite mathematical structure in a class or family in which size and certain
other features, such as the appearance of limit points, may vary.
Suppose we wanted to look abstractly at the structure the reals carry when
viewed as an ordered field. We might consider R as a set decorated by the fol-
lowing: a directed graph edge representing the ordering, a first directed hyperedge
representing the graph of addition, a second directed hyperedge representing the
graph of multiplication, perhaps a third for the graph of subtraction, and two con-
stant symbols marking the additive and multiplicative identities. Stepping back,
and retaining only this data of a set of size continuum along with the data of which
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sets of elements or tuples correspond to which constants, edges, or hyperedges, we
might try to analyze the configurations which do or do not arise there.
Suppose we were interested in the structure the group operation gives to the
discrete Heisenberg group H. We might consider H simply as an infinite set along
with the data of the multiplication table. A priori, this setup just records a count-
ably infinite set made into a group in the given way; it doesn’t a priori record that
its elements are matrices, much less uni-upper-triangular matrices over Z.
These examples suggest how models arise – simply as sets decorated by the data
of relations or functions we single out for study.1
The initial loss of information in such a representation will be balanced by the
fact that it allows us to place a model within a class and to study models in the
class alongside each other. From the model theoretic point of view – the following
statement is a starting point for investigation, not its conclusion – this class contains
all other models which differ from M in inessential ways.
To place our model M in its class, we consider the theory of the model, that is,
the set of all sentences of first order logic which hold in M . The elementary class of
M is the class of all other models with the same theory. We may frame our study
as: of such classes, or of theories.
Every model carries what are essentially derived relations, the boolean algebras
of definable sets (see the Appendix). We might say very informally that the theory
of a model takes a photograph of these boolean algebras which remembers only
finitary information, such as which finite intersections are and are not empty. The
models which share the theory of M will also share this photograph.
The differences among models with the same theory come essentially from the
infinite intersections which are finitely approximated, in other words, with the filters
and ultrafilters on the boolean algebra of definable sets, as we now explain.
Limit points. space
To see what engenders variation within an elementary class, the following story
will motivate the definition of type. (The motivation is in the telling, not an his-
torical assertion. Filters independently arose in other, earlier contexts in the early
part of the twentieth century.)
Writing their book on general topology in 1937, Bourbaki were discussing whether
the definition of limit could be liberated from the countable. Cartan’s suggestion
was effectively that working in a topological space X , one might turn the problem
around and look from the point of view of a limit point. Given a point x ∈ X ,
the family of neighborhoods containing x had certain very nice features – such as
upward closure, closure under finite intersection – which may be abstracted as the
definition of filter.2
1A k-place relation on a set X is a subset of Xk . The set of first coordinates of a binary
relation is called its domain. A k-place function on a set X is a single-valued binary relation
whose domain is Xk. To specify a model, we first choose a language, which can include relation
symbols, function symbols, and constant symbols. Then a model is given by the following data:
a set X, called the domain; for each relation symbol, a relation on X of the right arity; for each
function symbol, a function on X of the right arity; for each constant symbol, an element of X.
2I learned this story from Maurice Mashaal’s biography of Bourbaki, which also cites bio-
graphical work of Liliane Beaulieu. Regarding Cartan’s definition of filters: “At first [the others]
met the idea with skepticism, but Chevalley understood the importance of Cartan’s suggestion
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Definition 0.1. For I an infinite set, F ⊆ P(I) is a filter on I when (i) A ⊆ B ⊆ I
and A ∈ F implies B ∈ F , (ii) A,B ∈ F implies A ∩B ∈ F , (iii) ∅ /∈ F .
Conversely, to any filter, one can assign a (possibly empty) set of limit points:
those elements of I which belong to all A ∈ F . In defining a filter, we may restrict
to any boolean algebra B ⊆ P(I), asking that F ⊆ B, and adding that B in item
(ii) belong to B. In the model theoretic context, this idea gives us a natural way to
define limit points for any model, not requiring a metric or a topology per se:
Definition 0.2. Informally, a partial type p over a model M is a filter on M
for the boolean algebra of M -definable subsets of M . [More correctly, it is a set of
formulas with parameters from M , whose solution sets in M form such a filter.3]
It is a type if it is maximal, i.e. not strictly contained in any other partial type
over M . The Stone space S(M) is the set of types over M .
A type is realized if a corresponding limit point exists in the model, otherwise
it is omitted. For example, if M = (Q, <) is the rationals considered as a linear
order, S(M) includes a type for each element of M , which are realized, and types
for each irrational Dedekind cut, for +∞, for −∞, and for various infinitessimals,
which are omitted.
The compactness theorem for first order logic ensures that for any model M and
any type or set of types over M we can always find an extension of M to a larger
model in the same class in which all these types are realized. (Put otherwise, we
may realize types without changing the theory.) Types are fundamental objects in
all that follows. From the depth and subtlety of their interaction comes much of
the special character of the subject.4
In Definition 0.2, we may use “A-definable sets” instead of “M -definable sets”
for some A ⊆ M [more correctly, formulas in one free variable with parameters
from A]. In this case, call p a type or partial type of M over A. Then the following
fundamental definition, from work of Morley and of Vaught in the early 1960s,
generalizing ideas from Hausdorff on ηα sets, gives a measure of the completeness
of a model.
Definition 0.3. For an infinite cardinal κ, we say a model N is κ+-saturated if
every type of N over every A ⊆ N of size ≤ κ is realized in N .
For example, if M is an algebraically closed field then for any subfield K of M ,
the types of M over K will include a distinct type for each minimal polynomial
over K (describing a root) and one type describing an element transcendental over
K. Since it is algebraically closed, M will be κ+-saturated if and only if it has
transcendence degree at least κ+.
and even proposed another idea based on it (which became the concept of ultrafilters). Once the
approval was unanimous, someone yelled « boum ! » (French for “bang!”) to announce that a
breakthrough had been made – this was one of Bourbaki’s many customs.” [25]
3This difference is visible in the idea of realizing a given type over M in a model N extending
M . The new limit point will belong to the solution sets, in N , of the formulas in the type. Note
that 0.2 describes types of elements, corresponding to sets of formulas in one free variable plus
parameters from M . For each n > 1 there is an analogous Sn(M) describing types of n-tuples.
4And a certain possible conversion of combinatorial into algebraic information, as in the re-
markable group configuration theorems of Zilber and Hrushovski.
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Towards classification theory. space
Having described a model theoretic point of view – first, regarding a given math-
ematical object as a model; second, placing it within an elementary class of models
sharing the same first-order theory; third, studying as our basic objects these the-
ories, looking both at how models may vary for a given theory (by paying close
attention to the structure of types) and at structural differences across theories –
some first notable features of this setup are:
a) one can study the truth of statements of first order logic by ‘moving’ statements
among models in allowed ways.5
b) when working in a given elementary class, unusual constraints observed on vari-
ation of models may give leverage for a structural understanding of all models
in the class. E.g. Morley’s theorem, the ‘cornerstone’ of modern model theory,
says that if a countable theory has only one model up to isomorphism in some
uncountable size κ, then this must be true in every uncountable size. More-
over its models must behave analogously to algebraically closed fields of a given
characteristic in the sense that, e.g., there are prime models over sets, there are
relatively few types, and for each model there is a single invariant, a dimension
(the equivalent of transcendence degree) giving the isomorphism type.
c) simply understanding the structure of the definable sets, say in specific classes
containing examples of interest, can already involve deep mathematics. For in-
stance, Tarski’s proof of quantifier elimination for the reals and the cell decom-
position theorem for o-minimal structures.
In the examples given so far, as is often the case in mathematics, the specific
role of the infinite may be mainly as a kind of foil reflecting the fine structure of
compactness, irrespective of the otherwise depth of proofs.
To see the interaction of model theory and set theory which we invoked at the
beginning, we need to go further up and further in. (As an aside, already in Hilbert’s
remarks, via Church, there is an implicit parallel between the understanding of
infinite sizes and the development of different models.6) Suppose we step back and
study the class of all theories.
A thesis of Shelah’s groundbreaking Classification Theory (1978) is that one can
find dividing lines among the class of first-order theories. A dividing line marks
a sea change in the combinatorial structure. (The assertion that something is a
dividing line requires evidence on both sides: showing that models of theories on
one side are all complex in some given sense, while models of theories on the other
side admit some kind of structure theory.) A priori it is not at all obvious that these
5 A clever example is Ax’s proof that any injective polynomial map from Cn to Cn is surjective.
For each finite k and n, there is a sentence ϕn,k of first order logic in the language {+,×, 0, 1}
asserting that any injective map given by (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (p1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , pn(x1, . . . , xn))
where the pi are of degree ≤ k is surjective. For each prime p, we may write F¯p as the union of an
increasing chain of finite fields. The assertion ϕn,k is true in each finite field because it is finite,
and it follows (e.g. from its logical form) that ϕn,k holds in F¯p. For D any nonprincipal ultrafilter
on the primes,
∏
p∈P
F¯p/D is isomorphic to C, so by  Los’ theorem ϕn,k is true in C.
6 “Hilbert does not say that the order in which the [list of 23] problems are numbered gauges
their relative importance, and it is not meant to suggest that he intended this. But he does mention
the arithmetical formulation of the concept of the continuum and the discovery of non-Euclidean
geometry as being the outstanding mathematical achievements of the preceding century, and gives
this as a reason for putting problems in these areas first, ” [1].
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should exist. Why wouldn’t the seemingly unconstrained range and complexity of
theories allow for some kind of continuous gradation along any reasonable axis?
The example of extremal combinatorics may give a hint: graphs of a given large
finite size are not so easily classifiable, but by examining asymptotic growth rates
of certain phenomena, jumps may appear.
Stability, the dividing line which has most profoundly influenced the present field,
arises in [28] from counting limit points. For a theory T and an infinite cardinal λ,
we say T is λ-stable if for every model M of T of size λ, |S(M)| = λ. Conversely,
if some model M of T of size λ has |S(M)| > λ, T is λ-unstable. For a given λ, T
is either λ-stable or λ-unstable by definition. But varying λ, the gap appears7:
Theorem 0.4 (Shelah 1978). Any theory T is either stable, meaning stable in all
λ such that λ|T | = λ, or unstable, meaning unstable in all λ.
This theorem materializes in step with the development of the internal structure
theory. The set theoretic scaffolding is not only in the statement, but intricately
connected to its development. A few examples from [28, II-III] will give a flavor:
i) it turns out stability is local: if T is unstable, then there is a single formula
ϕ such that in all λ, we can already get many types just using definable sets
which are instances of ϕ. (This leads to discovering instability has a character-
istic combinatorial configuration, the order property.) Its proof is a counting
argument relying on the fact that T is unstable in some λ such that λ = λ|T |.
ii) a characteristic property of stable theories is that once there is enough infor-
mation, types have unique generic extensions to types over larger sets. This is
first explained by the finite equivalence relation theorem which studies types
over sets A of size at least 2 in models which are (|A||T |)+-saturated.
iii) conversely, large types are essentially controlled by their restrictions to “small”
sets. The cardinal defining this use of “small,” κ(T ), is ≤ |T |+. Above this
cardinal the mist clears and stability’s effects are easier to see; one can e.g.
characterize larger saturated models of stable theories as those which are κ(T )-
saturated and every maximal indiscernible set has the cardinality of the model.
iv) instability has a more random form and a more rigid form, and at least one
must occur. To see the difference between the two by counting types, one has
to know that 2λ can potentially be different from the number of cuts in a dense
linear order of size λ (or the number of branches in a tree with λ nodes), which
was originally noted by appeal to an independence result.
Of course, to say infinite cardinals are strongly connected to the development of
stability doesn’t mean they are necessarily there at the end. The order property,
definability of types, forking, the independence property, and the strict order prop-
erty, to name a few, don’t bear the imprint of their origin. This translation is part
of model theory’s power.
Looking forwards: the effect of stability, inside and outside model theory, has
been significant. Despite this conclusive evidence that some dividing lines do exist,
and that they can be very useful, further ones have been challenging to find. We
know very few in the vast territory of unstable theories, found – like stability – one
by one in response to specific counting problems. To go further, perhaps we can
try to shift the way in which set theory sounds out model theoretic information.
7|T |, the size of T , will be the maximum of the size of the language and ℵ0.
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The reader may wonder: is model theory being described as a kind of extension
to the infinite setting of extremal arguments in combinatorics, with the hierarchy
of infinite cardinals replacing the natural numbers? This analogy is challenging,
but incomplete. It is incomplete because the finitary, extremal picture doesn’t
seem to provide a precedent or explanation for the role of model theory, which
builds in a remarkable way a bridge between the infinite combinatorial world and
a more algebraic one. Still, it is challenging because it leads us to ask what in the
infinite setting may play the role of those crucial tools of the combinatorial setting,
which may seem to have little place in current model theoretic arguments – namely,
probability and randomness.
Ultrapowers. space
Only in the move to ultrapowers does one really recover, albeit in a metaphor-
ical way, that other key ingredient of extremal arguments, the understanding of
probability and average behavior.
Stability arises from counting limit points. Recall from 0.3 that saturation is
a notion of completeness for a model: λ+-saturation means all types over all sub-
models of size at most λ are realized. The ultrapower construction, given formally
below, starts with a given model and amplifies it – staying within the elementary
class – according to a specific kind of averaging mechanism, an ultrafilter. The
resulting larger model, which depends only on the model we began with and the
ultrafilter, is called an ultrapower. The level of saturation in the ultrapower reflects
whether the given averaging mechanism, applied to the given model, leads to the
appearance of many limit points of smaller sets.
If so, this may indicate either that the ultrafilter is powerful, or that the types
of the model are not complex. Since we can apply the same ultrafilter to different
models and compare the results, however, we can use this construction to compare
the ‘complexity’ of different models (and, dually, of ultrafilters). Restricting to
the powerful class of regular ultrafilters, whose ability to produce saturation in
ultrapowers will be an invariant of the elementary class of the model we begin with,
we can use this construction to compare the complexity of theories. Informally for
now, the relation on complete countable theories setting T1 E T2
if for any regular ultrafilter D, if D-ultrapowers of models of T2 are
sufficiently saturated, so are D-ultrapowers of models of T1
is Keisler’s order, defined in 1967. It is a pre-order on theories, considered as a
partial order on the equivalence classes of theories.
The theorem which convinced the author of this essay, reading around 2005, that
it was urgent to study E further was a theorem in Shelah’s Classification Theory
in a chapter devoted to the ordering. The theorem says that the union of the first
two equivalence classes in Keisler’s order is precisely the stable theories.
This theorem can be understood as saying that the class of stable theories,
which we can see by counting types, can also be seen by asking about good average
behavior. Beyond stability, our counting is less useful, and yet the other half, about
average behavior, retains its power.
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In more detail. space
The idea of a filter was used in 0.2 above to find limit points, but it can also be
used to give averages. Maximal filters, called ultrafilters, can be thought of as a
coherent choice of which subsets of a given set I are “large.”
Definition 0.5. For an infinite set I, D ⊆ P(I) is an ultrafilter if it is a filter
not strictly contained in any other filter. (We will assume ultrafilters contain all
co-finite sets.)
The ultraproduct by D of a family of models 〈Mi : i ∈ I〉 is a model, built in
two steps, reflecting the definition of model. First, we define the domain. Identify
two elements 〈a[i] : i ∈ I〉, 〈b[i] : i ∈ I〉 of the Cartesian product
∏
iMi if {i ∈ I :
a[i] = b[i]} ∈ D. Definition 0.1 makes this an equivalence relation, and the domain
of our ultraproduct N is the set of equivalence classes. Next, fix for transparency a
representative of each equivalence class, so that for a ∈ N and i ∈ I, “a[i]” makes
sense. The relations, functions, and constants of our language are defined on the
ultraproduct by consulting the average of the models: e.g. we say a given k-place
relation R holds on a1, . . . , ak in N iff {i : R(a1[i], . . . , ak[i]) holds in Mi} ∈ D,
and for an n-place function f , define f(a1, . . . , an) to be the equivalence class of
〈b[i] : i ∈ I〉 where b[i] = f(a1[i], . . . , an[i]) computed in Mi. The special case of an
ultrapower, where all the factor models are isomorphic, transforms a given structure
into a larger, ‘amplified’ model in the same elementary class. For example, letting
D be a regular ultrafilter on the set of primes,
∏
p Fp/D
∼= C, but if we consider the
ultrapowerMP /D where M is the algebraic closure of the rationals, we also get C.
There is a veiled interaction between the two model theoretic uses of filters: the
realization of types in the ultrapower, and the ultrafilter used in the construction.
This is most useful when the ultrafilter is regular, ensuring that saturation depends
only on finitary input from each factor model. For each regular D, whether or not
an ultrapowerM I/D is |I|+-saturated is an invariant of the elementary class of the
model M we began with.8
Keisler’s suggestion was that this could be used to compare theories.
Definition 0.6 (Keisler’s order, 1967). Let T1, T2 be complete countable theories.
T1 E T2
if for every infinite λ, every regular ultrafilter D on λ, every model M1 of T1 and
every model M2 of T2, if (M2)
λ/D is λ+-saturated, then (M1)λ/D is λ+-saturated.
Informally, say “D saturates T ” if for some (by regularity of D, the choice does
not matter) model M of T , Mλ/D is λ+-saturated: all limit points over small sub-
models appear. Then Keisler’s order puts T1 less than T2 if every regular ultrafilter
able to saturate T2 is able to saturate T1. Note that any two theories may in princi-
ple be compared – algebraically closed fields of fixed characteristic, random graphs,
real closed fields. Keisler proved his order was well defined and had a minimum
and a maximum class (he gave a sufficient condition for membership in each), and
asked about its structure.
8That can be taken as a definition of regular; alternatively, D is a regular ultrafilter on I if
there is a set {Xα : α < |I|} ⊆ D such that the intersection of any infinitely many of its elements
is empty. Regular ultrafilters are easy to build and exist on any infinite set.
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The crucial chapter on Keisler’s order in [28] was already mentioned. Its struc-
ture on the unstable, non-maximal theories was left there as an important open
question. Following [28], work on Keisler’s order stalled for about thirty years. The
question was reopened in Malliaris’ thesis and in the series of papers [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], guided by the perspective described above. Then in the last few years, a
very productive ongoing collaboration of Malliaris and Shelah [17], [18], [19], [20],
[21], [22], [23]... has advanced things considerably.
The current picture. space
Along this road, what does one find?
(a) First, we do indeed see evidence of dividing lines – many more than previously
thought. Much remains to be done in understanding them and in characterizing
the structure/nonstructure which come with the assertion of a dividing line, but
already their appearance, in a region of theories thought to be relatively tame, is
surprising and exciting. In [23], Malliaris and Shelah prove that Keisler’s order has
infinitely many classes. The theories which witness these different classes come from
higher analogues of the countable triangle-free random graph, originally studied by
Hrushovski [3]: the infinite generic tetrahedron-free three-hypergraph, the infinite
generic 4-uniform hypergraph with no complete hypergraph on 5 vertices, and so
on. The proof shows they may have very different average behavior, as reflected in
their differing sensitivity to a certain degree of calibration in the ultrafilters.
These results build on advances in ultrafilter construction, which allow for a
greater use of properties of cardinals, even for ultrafilters in ZFC.
Several incomparable classes are known [24], [30], and it may be that future
work will reveal many. Perhaps the way that such averages could be perturbed or
distorted, and by extension the structure of dividing lines among unstable theories,
will be much finer than what we now see. If so, even independence results could
be quite useful model theoretically. These may simply witness that the boolean
algebras associated to different theories are essentially different, because they react
differently to certain exotic averaging mechanisms, when these appear. The internal
theories of each equivalence class, giving an account of what allows for the different
reactions, would presumably be, like IP or SOP, absolute.
(b) Second, this line of work has led to some surprising theorems about the finite
world. These theorems have the following general form. We know that among the-
ories with infinite models, stability is a dividing line, with models of stable theories
admitting a strong structure theory. There is a specific combinatorial configuration,
the order property, which (in infinite models) characterizes instability. In an infinite
graph, instability for the edge relation would correspond to having arbitrarily large
half-graphs, that is, for all k having vertices a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bk with an edge
between ai and bj iff i < j. (Note that there are no assertions made about edges
among the a’s and among the b’s, so in forbidding k-half graphs, we forbid a family
of configurations.) The thesis of Malliaris and Shelah [16] is essentially that finite
graphs with no long half-graphs, called stable graphs, behave much better than all
finite graphs, in the sense predicted by the infinite case.
Szemere´di’s celebrated regularity lemma says, roughly, that for every ǫ > 0 there
is N = N(ǫ) such that any sufficiently large graph may be equitably partitioned
into k ≤ N pieces such that all but at most ǫk2 pairs of pieces have the edges
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between them quite evenly distributed (i.e. are ǫ-regular). The elegant picture of
this lemma absorbs the general complexity of graphs in two ways: first, by work
of Gowers, N is a very large function of ǫ; second, as noticed independently by a
number of researchers, the condition that some pairs of pieces be irregular cannnot
be removed, as shown by the example of half-graphs [6]. As a graph theorist, one
might expect half-graphs to be just one example of bad behavior, not necessarily
unique; but in light of the above, a model theorist may guess that in the absence
of long half-graphs one will find structured behavior. The stable regularity lemma
of [16] shows that indeed, half-graphs are the only reason for irregular pairs: finite
stable graphs admit regular partitions with no irregular pairs and the number of
pieces singly-exponential in ǫ.
A second theorem in that paper, a stable Ramsey theorem, proves that for each
k there is c = c(k) such that if G is a finite graph with no k-half graphs then
G contains a clique or an independent set of size |G|c, much larger than what is
predicted by Ramsey’s theorem. This meets the prediction of the Erdo˝s-Hajnal
conjecture, which says that for any finite graph H there is c = c(H) such that if
G contains no induced copies of H then G contains a clique or an independent set
of size |G|c. But very few other cases of this conjecture are known. What is the
contribution of the infinite here? The infinite version of Ramsey’s theorem says that
a countably infinite graph contains a countable clique or a countable independent
set. Extending this to larger cardinals doesn’t get far: Erdo˝s-Rado shows the graph
and the homogeneous set may not, in general, increase at the same rate. Model
theory, however, refracts this result across different classes of theories, and across
dividing lines, and in some classes, such as the stable theories, it behaves differently:
the existence of large sets of indiscernibles in stable theories implies, a fortiori, that
an infinite stable graph of size κ+ will have a clique or independent set of size κ+,
much larger than predicted by Erdo˝s-Rado. Once one knows where to look, one
can find the analogous phenomenon in the finite case (also for hypergraphs).
The stable Ramsey theorem was applied by Malliaris and Terry [15] to re-prove a
theorem in the combinatorics literature, by re-organizing the proof into cases which
take advantage of the stable Ramsey theorem, and thus to obtain better bounds for
the original theorem; finitary model-theoretic analysis may be useful even where
model theoretic hypotheses are not used in the theorems.
It may seem that these theorems of [16], from the first joint paper of Malliaris and
Shelah, could in principle have been discovered earlier, and yet they were not. They
belong to the perspective of this program in a deep way. They were motivated by
work in [9] and [10], directed towards Keisler’s order, which first applied Szemere´di
regularity to study the complexity of formulas (and showed that the simple theories,
of special interest in Keisler’s order, were in some sense controlled by stable graphs).
(c) Third, by means of these methods model theory has paid an old debt to set
theory and general topology, by solving a seventy-year-old problem about cardinal
invariants of the continuum. Two infinite cardinals, p and t, known to be uncount-
able but no larger than the continuum, are shown in Malliaris and Shelah [20], [21]
to be unconditionally equal. The proof is model-theoretic, and comes in the con-
text of the solution of an a priori unrelated problem, determining a new sufficient
condition for maximality in Keisler’s order.
In slightly more detail, in order for a regular ultrafilter to handle the most com-
plex theories, those in the maximum class, it must be in some sense very balanced.
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Distortions and so to speak imperfections which might pass unnoticed in more
robust theories will translate immediately in maximal theories to the omission of
types. However, a surprising fact from [28] is that what is needed for the theory to
be complex is not necessarily that it be expressive. A kind of brittleness or overall
rigidity as exemplified by the theory of linear order will also suffice. Remarkably,
it turns out even less will suffice: the engine of the proof in [21] is in showing that
if the ultrafilter can ensure certain paths through trees have upper bounds, it must
be strong enough to produce the needed limit points for any theory. The resulting
comparison of theories whose models contain the relevant trees, to models of linear
orders, via ultrapowers, turns out to be parallel in a precise sense to the compar-
ison of p and t. It was possible to give a fundamental model-theoretic framework
encompassing both problems and so to solve them both. A commentary and an
expository account of the proof are [27], [31].
Still, a model theoretic necessary condition for maximality remains open.
It has been almost ten years since [8]. Profound questions remain, urgent in their
simplicity.
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Appendix: on definable sets. space
By convention, we always assume our language L contains a binary relation sym-
bol =, and that in every L-model this symbol is interpreted as equality. Besides the
symbols of L, our alphabet for building formulas includes infinitely many variables
along with logical symbols (, ),∧,∨,¬, ⇐⇒ , =⇒ , ∀, ∃.
For awhile letM⋆ denote a model for the language L⋆ = {+,×,−, 0, 1, <}, where
+, ×, − are binary function symbols, < is a binary relation, and 0, 1 are constants.
Let us say the domain of M⋆ is R and the symbols have their usual interpretation.
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The terms of a language are elaborate names. We define terms by induction.
All variables and constant symbols are terms; if f is a k-place function symbol
and t1, . . . , tk are terms, then f(t1, . . . , tk) is a term; and a finite string of allowed
symbols is a term iff it can be built in finitely many steps in this way.
The L⋆-terms include 0, 1, 1 + 1 which we may abbreviate 2, x+ 1, x× y, (x×
1)+(y+0), ((x×x)×x) which we may abbreviate x3. Using similar abbreviations,
and dropping parentheses for readability, x5 + 15x2 + 3x+ 5 is also a term.
A key feature of terms is that if we are working in a model, and we are given
a term along with instructions of which elements of the model to put in for which,
if any, variables in the term (recall that in any model, any constant symbols must
already refer to specific elements), then the term will evaluate unambiguously to
some other element of the model.
Next, by induction, we define formulas. Atomic formulas are assertions that a
given relation symbol of our language holds on a given sequence of terms. (In L⋆,
the relation symbols are = and <, so these will include x3 + 5x + 2 = 0 and also
5 + x + 15y2 > 37 − z.) Atomic formulas are formulas. If ϕ is a formula, then
¬(ϕ) is a formula. If ϕ and ψ are formulas, then (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ =⇒ ψ),
(ϕ ⇐⇒ ψ) are also formulas. If ϕ is a formula, and x is a variable, then (∃x)ϕ
and (∀x)ϕ are formulas. A finite string of allowed symbols is a formula iff it can be
built in finitely many steps in this way.
In our example here are some more formulas: (∀x)(x+0 = x), (∃x)(y+x2 = z).
Note an important difference between the two. (∀x)(x+0 = x) is an assertion which
will be true or false in any given model; in our given M⋆ it is true. By contrast,
(∃x)(y + x2 = z) is neither true nor false, since it has two free variables; rather, it
has a solution set, the pairs (a, b) of elements of M such that (∃x)(a + x2 = b). In
any model N , the solution sets of formulas with one or more [but always finitely
many] free variables are called the definable sets. The closure properties of the set
of formulas show that for each n, the definable sets on Nn form a boolean algebra.
The formulas with no free variables are called sentences, and the theory of a
model N is the set of all sentences which hold in N . The elementary class of N
is the class of all other models in the same language with the same theory. The
reason a theory may make assertions about definable sets which are meaningful
across different models is by referring to their defining formulas.
When a formula has many free variables, it may be useful to look at the restricted
solution set we get after specifying that certain of the free variables take certain
values in the model. For example, in the formula xy2+zy+w = 0 with free variables
x, y, z, w, we might want to consider the solution set under specific values of x, z
9Pedantically, the form of the symbols makes no demands on their interpretation (other than
the basic conditions in the footnote on p. 2); we could, for example, give a perfectly valid model
by interpreting both + and × by projection onto the first coordinate.
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and w. Such a solution set is called definable with parameters, the specific values
being the parameters. We may wish to record their provenance: given a subset
A of a model N , the sets definable with parameters from A are called A-definable
sets. Finally, a word on types. Given M and A ⊆ M , the set of formulas with
parameters from A and (say) one free variable can be made into a boolean algebra
once the formulas are identified up to logical equivalence (equivalently, identified if
they define the same set in M). Its Stone space is the set of types of M over A in
the sense of 0.2 above, and its compactness as a topological space is explained by
the compactness theorem.
Some examples – here, definable means with parameters:
1) in the model M⋆ above, the definable sets include the semialgebraic sets (and it
is a theorem that they are exactly the semialgebraic sets). Its elementary class
is the class of real closed ordered fields.
2) if L = {+,×,−, 0, 1} and M is the algebraic closure of the rationals on which
the symbols have their usual interpretation, the definable sets include (and, in
fact, are) the constructible sets. The elementary class of M is the class of all
algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero.
3) if L = {<}, and M is the rationals on which < has its usual interpretation,
the definable sets in one free variable are finite unions of points and intervals
(and the definable sets in k > 1 free variables satisfy a cell decomposition the-
orem). The elementary class of M , the class of dense linear orders without a
first or last element, has only one countable model, up to isomorphism, but 2λ
nonisomorphic models of each uncountable size λ.
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